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Abstract
We study the link between officer injuries-on-duty and the force-
use of their peers using a network of officers who, through a random
lottery, began the police academy together. We find that peer injuries-
on-duty increase the probability of using force by 7%. The effect is con-
centrated in a narrow time window near the event and is not associ-
ated with significantly lower injury risk to the officer. Complaints of
improper searches and failure to provide service also increase after peer
injuries, suggesting that the increase in force might be driven by height-
ened risk aversion. JEL CODES: B55; D81; D83; J01, K00, K10, K42
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21. INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement is an unpredictable and hazardous occupation. Be-
tween 2004 and 2016, Chicago police officers arrested 130,000 adults and
one in 175 of these resulted in an officer being injured. In 2014, police offi-
cers also reported an on-the-job injury rate four times higher than the aver-
age all other occupations (BLS, 2014) with the leading cause of these injuries
being assaults or violent acts by the civilians with whom they interact (Ties-
man et al., 2018).1 Officers are cognizant of this risk: a 2016 PEW poll found
that 84% of police officers worried about their safety on the job with 42%
stating that they are nearly always seriously concerned (PEW, 2016). The
use of physical violence against suspects to compel compliance is seen as a
central means of self-protection against this risk, yet it often has tragic out-
comes.
Nearly four percent of arrests involve physical force. From 2015 to 2018, po-
lice officers killed over 3,000 individuals (The Guardian, 2018; Washington
Post, 2018), and there is growing evidence of externalities resulting from the
use of force. The use of police force can reduce the educational performance
of minority groups (Ang, 2019; Legewie and Fagan, 2019), affect attitudes
toward police (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993; Weitzer and Tuch, 2004; Brunson
and Miller, 2005) and undermine police legitimacy (Tyler 2004; Ramsey and
Robinson 2015; Lum and Nagin 2017; Nagin and Manski 2017). In response,
there has been a surge of research trying to understand the use of force by
officers and the policies aiming to curb it.
The decision to use force is a consequence of officer-civilian interactions. In
1While police officers face an on-the-job risk higher than the average profession, felony
killings of police have decreased by fifty percent from 1992 to 2013 (National Law Enforce-
ment Officers Memorial Fund).
3each encounter with a civilian, officers face the risk of injury. In the language
of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), since officers cannot fully insure against the
risk of injury, they use force to satisfy their demand for self-protection. How-
ever, past researchers have found evidence suggesting officers may deviate
from use-of-force policies of using force due to multiple factors: incom-
plete training or monitoring (Prendergast 2001; Prendergast 2003; Shi 2009;
Drover and Ariel, 2015; Ready and Young, 2015; Ariel et al., 2017; Owens,
2018; Ba, 2018; Ba and Rivera, 2019); the technology at their disposal (Ba
and Grogger, 2018); or discriminatory preferences against civilian suspects
(Legewie, 2016; Fryer 2018; Cesario et al., 2018).
This paper examines the role of peer injuries in an officer’s decision to use
force. We first show that there is a strong correlation between officer injuries
and the propensity of others to use force (Figure 3). We then exploit the ran-
dom lottery that determines which officers begin the police academy in the
same month to identify exogenously assigned peer groups. Using officers
assigned to different units after graduating from the academy, we conduct
an event study on the frequency of uses of force following a former peer on-
duty injury.
Our peer group definition follows Ager, Bursztyn and Voth (2019). We ex-
clude peers still serving in the same police district to avoid contamination
from correlated shocks to civilian non-compliance. This research design al-
lows for exogenous variation in peer characteristics that is uncorrelated with
individual characteristics, avoiding common issues in the estimation of en-
dogenous peer effects or contextual effects (Manski, 1993; Angrist, 2014).
We show that peer injuries substantially increase the use of force in the week
following a former peer’s on-duty injury, leading to more civilian injuries.
4Consistent with homophily, we find that injuries to more demographically
similar peers have stronger effects.
The question of whether there are spillovers in police force resulting from
on-the-job injuries has important implications for policies meant to reduce
improper use of force. Policies which increase the risk of injury to officers
will have a muted effect on force-use when officers respond to risk by in-
creasing force. For example, Ariel et al. (2017) finds that assaults against
officers increased after the introduction of body cameras. Given our find-
ings, this suggests that failing to account for injury-risk externalities associ-
ated with peer injuries will cause policy makers to under-state the impact of
body cameras on the use of force.
Body cameras themselves might make officers less likely to use force, but if
body cameras cause increased peer injuries, as Ariel et al. (2017) find, then
the officers’ resulting decrease in use of force would be smaller or even neg-
ative when implemented at scale. Alternatively, policies that reduce the risk
to officers may have positive externalities on force use. For example, Ba and
Grogger (2018) find that the introduction of Tasers reduced injuries to police
officers. 2 If the available technology decreases the propensity of an officer
to be injured, their peers will respond by reducing force-use.
To aid in the interpretation of these results, we go on to investigate poten-
tial drivers of the behavior. We consider three potential channels: social
learning (Banergee et al, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992), peer effects in
misconduct (Manski, 1993; Ouellet, 2019) and transitory emotional shocks
that increase risk-aversion (Lowenstein et al., 2015; Shum and Xin, 2019).
We find limited evidence of social learning and no evidence of peer effects
2However, they did not find any change in civilian injury rates or the use of firearms.
5in misconduct. We attempt to determine whether the transitory emotional
shocks officers face cause an increase in preferences for certainty (Cullen et
al., 2014) or frustration (Aizer, 2009; Card and Dahl, 2011; Munyo and Rossi
2011; Eren and Mocan, 2016). A substantial increase in the probability of
receiving a complaint for failing-to-provide service in the week following a
peer injury suggests that primed risk-aversion may be driving these results.
This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on the determinants of
police force (e.g., Fryer, 2018; Owens, 2018, Rivera and Ba, 2019; Ba, Knox,
Mummolo and Rivera, 2019; Annan-Phan and Ba, 2019) by providing evi-
dence that police officers respond to the risk faced by their peers. This paper
also contributes to a growing literature demonstrating that traumatic events
can influence decisions under uncertainty.
Callen et al. (2014) find that individuals experiencing violence have increased
certainty premiums, while Cameron and Shah (2013) find similar increases
in risk aversion among individuals affected by natural disasters. Addition-
ally, Imas, Kuhn, and Mironova (2018) find that violence can lead to increased
impatience while Moya (2018) and Brown et al (2018) find that recent vio-
lence can trigger increases in risk aversion.3 The paper most related to this
work is Shum and Xin (2019) find that “near-miss” accidents increase risk-
aversion by three to thirty percent. We find that police officers increase their
propensity to use force without a significant decrease in the propensity to be
injured after a peer experiences an injury. This is consistent with the officers
having temporarily heightened risk aversion.
3Not all of the evidence points to risk aversion increasing after traumatic experiences.
Voors et al. (2012) and Eckel et al. (2009) find that traumatic experiences can decrease risk
aversion. Exposure to violence has been shown to negatively impact emotional regulation
(Osofsky, 1995)
6We contribute to the literature on the effect of emotions on decision mak-
ing. Outside of this paper, much of the research on this topic has centered
on the effect of the weather (Busse et al., 2015) and unexpected losses of
local sports teams (Card and Dahl, 2011; Munyo and Rossi 2011; Eren and
Mocan, 2016). We extend this literature to show that peer injuries may act
as a transitory emotional shock influencing the emotional state of economic
agents in a high-stakes setting.
Our findings also have broader implications for the peer effects literature.
Similar to Hjort (2014) and Agarwal et al. (2018), we find that individuals re-
spond to the outcomes their peers experience, but do not directly respond
to their actions. Similar to Bayer et al., (2009) we also find that peers can
influence the decisions of individuals long after the observed network has
dissipated. This result suggests that researchers must account for the effects
of negative events that may coincide with peer actions when interpreting
the channel through which peers respond. For example, Carrell and Hoek-
stra (2010) find negative spillovers from children in troubled families, using
domestic violence at home as an instrument. They argue that these peer
effects operate through the reduced achievement or increased disruption of
the affected child, supporting a “bad apples” model of peer effects. Similarly,
in a quasi-experimental study with the military Murphy (2018) attributes
contemporaneous misconduct as peers responding to the poor behavior of
their peers. The findings in our paper suggest that these results may partially
driven by individuals responding directly to the negative outcomes realized
by their peers.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background
on the formation of police networks and the Chicago Police Department’s
use of force policy. In Section III, we describe the data we use. Section IV
7describes the research design used to generate the estimates presented in
Section V. Section VI discusses the potential mechanisms driving these ef-
fects. We conclude in section VII.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 FORMATIONOF POLICE NETWORKS
The Chicago Police Department’s recruitment process creates an ideal set-
ting to study spillover effects. The recruitment process generally follows five
steps: (1) a recruitment call4, (2) an entrance exam, (3) a referral lottery,
(4) a battery of physical and mental tests, and finally (5) attending a police
academy.
The Chicago Police Department regularly issues recruitment calls. Table 1
displays the nine recruitment calls made between 2002 and 2013. After ap-
plying, prospective officers take an exam meant to evaluate the officer’s cog-
nitive and non-cognitive abilities. All applicants who pass the exam move
on to Step 3 where the CPD adds them to an eligibility list and provides a
lottery number. These applicants are referred to the CPD academy in lot-
tery order as vacancies become available.5 Applicants remain on the lottery
list until it is either exhausted or retired (Chicago Police Department, 2016)
with veterans receiving priority in the randomization. This application pro-
cess ensures that individuals did not select into specific cohorts based on the
propensity to use force, be injured, or respond to peer injuries with violence.
4Officers who apply to be part of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) must fulfill age
and citizenship requirements. Applicants must also have a combination of post-secondary
and army training. The CPD accepts individuals with at least sixty semester hours from an
accredited university, three years of active duty in the armed forces or thirty semester hours
and one continuous year of active duty.
5Although, military veterans are given some priority in the lottery process.
8Referred applicants proceed to Step 4 where they take further examinations.
These include a physical test, background check, psychological evaluation
and drug test. After the officer passes these examinations, they start at the
police academy. If potential officers fail any examination, they do not pro-
ceed. Successful applicants attend the police academy, which we classify as
the peer group. Figure 4 presents a histogram of the cohort sizes during the
sample period. The cohort size, on average, is 48.60 individuals, although
cohort sizes have considerable range. Figure 8 shows that these cohorts are
starting throughout the sample period. On average, police academy cohorts
are 77% male, 49% white, 17% black, and 34% Hispanic. The median age of
new officers in our sample is 28.
Once applicants enter the academy, the Education and Training Division
provides 1,000 hours of basic training over six months. Training includes in-
struction on use of force tactics including firearms and control techniques.
There is also physical and scenario-based training in the classroom. CPD
recruits receive extra training on gangs, drugs, law, ethics, report writing, ve-
hicle stops, use of force, and driving. The academy also includes diversity
training for their officers (Chicago Police Department, 2017).
After completing the academy, officers complete roughly twelve months of
probationary field training 6 7 (Chicago Police Union Agreement, 2017). Dur-
ing the initial twelve months of active duty, the CPD assigns probationary
officers to districts at their discretion. Duty assignments can change day-
6Nearly all officers who begin training graduate from the police academy with fewer than
3% of officers failing (Chicago Tribune, 2017).
7The probationary period consists of eighteen months of active duty. The six months in
the academy and the next twelve in the probationary assignments. Time absent from duty
does not apply toward completion of the probationary period.
9to-day during this period, and we have no data on officer assignments dur-
ing this time. After the probationary period is over, officers move to a more
permanent police unit. These assignments prioritize the needs of the CPD
rather than the preferences of the police officer.
Police districts operate under the Bureau of Patrol. They are segmented into
three geographic areas (North, Central, and South) and a Special Functions
Division. The Special Functions Division contains units such as Canine,
Marine/Helicopter, SWAT, the Bomb Squad, etc. Since these units operate
across geographic districts, we omit them from the analysis. The remaining
three areas are each segmented further into districts. Each district is then
broken up further into beats that officers patrol.
The geographic unit of analysis considered in this paper is the police dis-
trict. In an average week, we observe 90.24 officers in each of the 22 units.
However, there is some dispersion. The distribution of unit sizes is shown
in Figure (5). The composition of each unit is made up of many different
cohorts (7).
2.2 USE OF FORCE POLICY
The Chicago Police Department defines the use of force as physical contact
by a Department member used to compel a subject’s compliance. It is the
Department’s policy to attempt to gain the voluntary compliance of subjects
when possible. However, members are not required to take actions, or fail to
take actions, that endanger themselves or third parties (Chicago Police De-
partment, General Order G03-02).
When attempting to gain the compliance of subjects, officers have several
10
options available to them. Officers can use mitigation efforts such as verbal
directions to gain compliance without using force. They may also use con-
trol tactics such as handcuffs or applying pressure to sensitive areas. Officers
are also permitted to use higher level responses with or without weapon;
these include open hand strikes, punches, kicks, and other forms of physical
violence. Lastly, the CPD permits officers to use Tasers, pepper spray, ba-
tons, and firearms under some circumstances.
In general, the CPD requires officers to use force that is “objectively reason-
able, necessary, and proportional to the actions of subject (Chicago Police
Department General Order G03-02, 2017). There is no formal definition of
“objectively reasonable.” However, officers are required to take into consid-
eration whether there is an imminent threat to themselves or third parties,
how much harm the threat poses, and whether the subject has immediate
access to weapons. When assessing the use of force, the CPD explicitly takes
into account the fact that department members may not have perfect infor-
mation regarding the compliance status of the suspect and that these deci-
sions are made quickly and under tense circumstances.
The proportionality requirement is in reference to the officers contempora-
neous beliefs about the threat he or she faces. This may be different than the
threat determined by an objective observer. Officers are only only allowed to
use force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to subjects when
it is the subject poses an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to
the officer or others in the surrounding area or when a person who had com-
mitted a forcible felony that involved the threatened infliction of great bodily
harm was trying to avoid arrest or run from the police. This type of force is
meant to be a last resort when all other de-escalation methods have failed.
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3. DATA
To answer our research we use four sources of administrative data from the
Chicago Police Department. Data on the use of force and injuries comes
from the CPD’s Tactical Response Reports (TRR) for non-juvenile suspects.
Tactical Response Reports are required in all incidents where a member of
the police department uses firearms, impact munitions, Tasers, acoustic de-
vices, impact weapons, mechanical actions/techniques, or chemical weapons.8
Minor levels of force, such as holds, handcuffing, and the force necessary to
overcome passive resistance do not require a TRR. However, members also
have to fill out TRRs when a suspect alleges an injury, if the suspect resists
arrest in a manner more severe than fleeing or in situations where suspects
use force against someone in the encounter, regardless of the officer’s deci-
sion to use force. (General Order G03-02-02).
Our data encompass over 16,000 instances of force by the CPD between Jan-
uary 2005 and October 2016. We supplement the data with employment
records that include unit assignments. These data have numerous strengths
relative to other existing data sets. They cover almost every instance of po-
lice use of force in Chicago, regardless of whether the officer injures or kills
the suspect.9 Second, the data contain detailed information about the time
and location of the incident along with suspect, officer, and interaction char-
acteristics. Third, the data report the start date of the officer, which is critical
to our identification strategy.10
The data also describe the suspects’ actions during the encounter from the
8The police department also requires TRRs for force involving canines, but canine units
are excluded from the analysis.
9The data exclude incidents involving juveniles because juvenile records are not subject
to Freedom of Information Act requests.
10Any police officer without a recorded start data is excluded from the analysis.
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perspective of the officer. The reports allow officers to classify suspects into
different resistance categories. Cooperative suspects comply with the offi-
cers absent the use of force. Non-cooperative suspects are classified as ac-
tive resisters, passive resisters, or assailants. Passive resisters fail to comply
with verbal or other direction. An active resister attempts to create distance
between herself and the officer. Assailants either threaten or use violence
against the officer or a third party.
To help identify the mechanisms driving the increase in force use, we sup-
plement this data with data on complaints issued against officers (See Ba
(2017) for a detailed discussion of this data). This data contains all allega-
tions of misconduct filed by civilians or other officers during our sample pe-
riod. These data include the individual(s) who filed the complaint, the in-
dividual(s) against whom the complaints were levied, the date of the action
about which the individual complained about, and the details of the action
(See Ba (2017) for more details). Attached to each officer week, we include
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the officer has any compliant filed against
them regarding an incident that occurred the week after a peer injury. We
also investigate three specific types of arrests: force and verbal abuse, false
search or arrest, and failure to provide service.
The data do have some flaws and limitations. The CPD use of force model
does not require TRRs for situations that involve minor force. For this rea-
son, it is likely that there is underreporting of this type of force and inter-
actions with cooperative suspects. Second, we observe the presence of an
injury, or alleged injury, to officers and civilians. However, the nature, ex-
tent, severity, or cause of the injuries are not observed in our data.11 Since
11The CPD refused to provide this information in the FOIA citing HIPPA privacy reglua-
tions.
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we are primarily interested in instances where suspects harm a police officer,
we restrict our treatment definition to injuries that occur during interactions
with suspects who the officers claim were assailants. While we cannot learn
the nature or extent of officer injuries from the data, there is some literature
on the type of injuries officers sustain suggesting that the primary cause of
injury is violence experienced on duty.12
Even under this restriction, we cannot know with certainty that the suspect
caused the injury or even that the suspect exerted a high level of resistance.
Officers may twist and ankle or sustain an injury by accident during inter-
actions with assailing civilians and these will be mis-classified as treatment
events in the analysis. Moreover, suspects and officers may have different
opinions about the amount of force used by the suspects. There is no in-
dependent check on the accuracy of the officer’s description of a suspect’s
resistance. As such, there is measurement error in the provision of this in-
formation. This mis-classification means that in some instances, we will be
treating control periods (no former peer injuries) as treated periods (at least
one former peer injury). This means that the mis-classification will attenu-
ate our treatment effects.
Lastly, CPD officer unit assignment data records officers as being a part of
the “academy” unit until they finish their probationary period. This means
12The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that of the 27,660 on-the-job injuries reported
in their 2014 sample, 27% were caused by violence or injuries by persons or animals (BLS,
2014). The next most common injury category was falls, slips, and trips; this category ac-
counted for 25.3% of injuries. Overexertion followed, accounting for 21.4%. Using data from
the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System-Occupational Supplement, Tiesman et
al. (2018) categorized the type of injuries officers experience nationally over a similar pe-
riod. They find that the leading cause of injury was from assaults and violent acts. Next
most common were bodily reactions and exertions as well as transportation incidents. Most
injuries were to the hands, legs, neck, head or shoulders. About 40% of injuries were contu-
sions, abrasions, lacerations, fractures, or dislocations. The other 60% were sprains, strains,
or other. In their sample, assault-related injuries grew between 2003 to 2011.
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that we cannot observe the geographic assignment in the year between when
an officer graduates the academy and when the officer is assigned a perma-
nent unit. Since local non-compliance shocks are a major threat to identifi-
cation, we drop entries from this period of time from the data set.
The limitations of our data force us to place some restrictions on the sam-
ple. We observe an officer’s unit assignment, but not the tasks they perform
on an individual day. For this reason, we restrict the sample to officers who
enter one of 22 geographic districts after graduating from their probation-
ary period. This means that we drop non-standard units such as the canine
unit or S.W.A.T. team, who move between geographic districts from day to
day. We also drop officers who leave the police academy before six months,
or individuals who never are registered as leaving the police academy in our
sample.13.
A total of 3,548 officers start the academy in our sample. After excluding offi-
cers who do no enter into a geographic district, we are left with 3,276 officers
and a total of 899,894 officer-week observations. Of these officers, 2,678 offi-
cers use force at least once in the sample with 1,886 instances accompanying
an injury or alleged injury to the suspect. In our sample, 1,192 officers expe-
rience injuries and nearly all officers (3,244) experience at least one injury to
a member of their police academy cohort.
4. RESEARCHDESIGN
The goal of the empirical analysis is to identify the causal effect of a police
officer’s on-the-job injury on one’s network. There are four major challenges
13See Appendix for more information.
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to identifying this effect, which this definition of peers helps us overcome.
Foremost, we need to be able to observe the relevant network for officers
in our sample. In principle, the relevant network here is the set of officers
whose injury status is observable to the officer in question. There are dif-
ferent ways that we could classify officers into a network using the data:
all officers, officers in the same unit, or officers who attended the police
academy together. Following Ager, Bursztyn and Voth (2019), the network
definition we use is officers who, through the random lottery, attended the
police academy together but no longer work in the same unit. We will hence-
forth refer to these peers as former peers to differentiate them from mem-
bers of the police academy who still work in the same district.14
This definition is used to overcome two threats to identification. Force-
use and officer injuries are co-determined. If more aggressive officers are
able to sort into more aggressive networks, then the correlated probability
of injuries and force-use will spuriously look like peer effects in the data.
The CPD assignment process rules out the possibility that officers sorted
into more aggressive cohorts. Second, there may be district-level common
shocks to civilian non-compliance within a district. If some shock increases
the probability that civilians in a given police district are non-compliant,
then the risk to the officer and the returns to using force will increase. Us-
ing former peers allows us to rule out district level shocks to civilian non-
compliance because officers will be compared to other individuals who face
the same non-compliance rate.
Finally, we must be able to overcome the simultaneity between an individ-
14This means that individuals who attended the police academy together and still work in
the same police district are considered to be untreated if an individual from their network
is injured.
16
ual’s actions and their peer’s actions referred to as the reflection problem
(Manski, 1993). Angrist (2014) shows that designs relying on ”cohort varia-
tion”, like that of the random lottery, do not overcome the reflection prob-
lem because identification relies on finite-sample fluctuations in treatment
assignment. The ideal research design for measuring spillover effects would
randomly assign subjects to treatment with an assignment probability that
is independently distributed across groups (Crepon et al., 2013). We approx-
imate this research design by combining the random assignment of cohort
with the quasi-random timing of injuries to officers.
In practice, we construct the counterfactual outcomes within district d and
week t variation, using injuries to police academy classmates as the treat-
ment. The effect of an officer injury is identified through an event study
comparing individuals experiencing and not experiencing an injury to a for-
mer peer and combining them into a difference-in-differences estimator.
The event of a peer injury occurrs at time t = Ei for individual i. We de-
note individual fixed effects as λi, district-week fixed effects as λdt. The main
estimating equation used to recover the causal effect of peer injuries is
Yidgt = λi + λdt + β · 1[t = Eg,−d + 1] + idgt (1)
The individual fixed effects account for time-invariant individual level dif-
ferences in the outcome. In the main specification considering the officer’s
decision to use force, this fixed effect will account for time-invariant dif-
ferences in interpreting the suspect’s actions as non-compliance. District-
week fixed effects account for district-week level differences in the costs or
benefits to choosing Yidgt = 1. These fixed effects will control for district-
specific shocks to civilian or officer aggression such as the weather or pol-
lution (Annan-Phan and Ba, 2019; Herrnstadt, 2019). The treatment, 1[t =
Eg,−d + 1], is equal to 1 if another officer who attended the police academy
17
with the officer, but is not working in the same district was injured in the
previous week.
The coefficient of interest is β, which estimates the change in the outcome
for affected officers relative to officers in the same district who did not expe-
rience a peer injury in the previous week. Standard errors are clustered on
the academy cohort level to allow for arbitrary correlation of errors within
each of the 73 cohorts. The main identifying assumption is that the change
in the outcome in a given district-week is independent of whether the in-
jured officer started the police academy in the same month as the officer.
injured officers attended the police academy with the officer.
To assess the plausibility of this assumption and examine the dynamic ef-
fects of a peer injury we regress the outcomes on lags and leads of the event.
Event time in this regression is denoted τ . We omit the dummy for the week
before a former peer is injured, set period −5 to be equal to one if the week
was five or more weeks before the injury and period 5 to be whether the
week is five or more periods after the injury so that we can interpret the co-
efficients relative to the week before injury.15
Yidgt = λi + λdt +
∑
τ
βτ · 1[t = Eg,−d + τ ] + idgt. (2)
Where τ = {−5+,−4,−3,−2, 0, 1, 3, 4, 5+}. In this regression, the coefficients
of interest, βτ , estimate the change in the outcome between period t = −1
and τ for officers who experienced a peer injury relative to members of the
same district who did not. Insignificant βτ estimates before the event allevi-
ate concerns that the groups differ in the probability of encountering non-
15The lags and leads will also alter the composition of individual-weeks that we observe.
The first and last five weeks of every individual will be excluded from the regression since
they are not observed with either five lags or five leads.
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compliant civilians or signal interpretation, but identification may still be
threatened by unobserved post-treatment shocks specific to members of a
particular police academy cohort.
We expect the results from this regression to be attenuated. Dropping the
data from the probationary year prevents us from observing the effect of
many officer’s first event. If the effect of treatment is decreasing in its fre-
quency, then we would expect this to bias the effects downward. Similarly,
the social cohesion within a cohort is likely the largest right after the academy
ends. As time passes, police officers may fall out of contact with each other
or develop different social networks. Thus, we should expect this year to
have the largest treatment effect on subjects. We expect the coefficients
from these regressions to be a lower bound of the average effect because we
will classify some innocuous injuries resulting from falls as civilian attacks.
This means that there will be some control events misclassified as treatment
events.
It is also unclear how quickly officers learn about peer injuries. If officers
learn about these injuries at different rates, we may be missing some of the
dynamics. Finally, since injuries can happen at any time, there are periods of
time that are both within five weeks after an injury and five weeks before an-
other injury. This means that there are some periods where the pre-period
for one injury is the post-period for another injury. This will bias the effect
in the pre-period upwards and at the same time the post-period downwards.
Lastly, because peer groups are large and we observe officers over several
years, officers experience multiple events over the time horizon in our sam-
ple. Standard event studies usually include one event per cross-sectional
unit and include mutually exclusive dummy variables representing each pe-
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riod from treatment. Our setting departs from this standard. While the prob-
ability an individual officer gets injured is one-quarter of a percent, over 95%
of weeks in our sample contain at least one officer injury. This translates into
roughly a 1 in 8 chance of experiencing a peer injury each week. Over the
observed portion of an officer’s career, the average officer experiences 0.89
injuries, 43.62 injuries to former peers, and 368.48 injuries to any police of-
ficer. This means that βτ can represent the effect for a period which is both a
pre-treatment period and a post-treatment period. Assuming the response
to treatment does not vary based on the number of previous events, this will
bias the pre-trend estimates away from zero and make it more likely for us to
find significant pre-trends. However, in nearly all specifications, we do not
find any evidence of significant pre-trends.
There is no accepted method of conducting event studies when there are
multiple or overlapping events. However, Monte Carlo simulation results in
Sandler and Sandler (2014) suggest that allowing multiple event dummies to
be non-zero at one time produces unbiased results under a similar data gen-
erating process. Further, they show that restricting the estimation to con-
sider only a single event or using only periods that have a single event per
individual/event/time produces biased results. We follow their guidance in
our estimation.
5. RESULTS
5.1 MAIN RESULTS
We first examine the effects of former peers’ injuries on the propensity to
use any type of force by estimating Equation (2). As cohorts join through-
out the sample period, the estimation equation will drop individuals who
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are not employed for five weeks before and after exposure. We estimate the
base rate of force use as the constant term from a regression of (2) without
individual or unit-week fixed effects. Figure (9) displays the coefficient esti-
mates from Equation (2) divided by the base rate. This allows us to interpret
the effects as percent changes from the baseline propensity to use force. We
display the magnitude of this ratio for each period on the vertical axis with
the time until exposure presented on the horizontal axis.
The effects of peer injuries are not significantly different from zero in the
weeks before former peer injury. Baseline use of force is also small, with
1.78% of officers using any type of force in a given week. In the week of a
peer injury, use of force increases by around 3% of the baseline mean. We
view this period as partially treated as some officers experience injuries to-
ward the end of the week. It also will take time for the officers to learn about
their peer’s injury status.
In the week following a peer injury, use of force increases by more than five
percent relative to the period before a peer is injured. The treatment effects
dissipate quickly over time, immediately losing significance after the first
week post exposure. This pattern is consistent with Card and Dahl (2011)
and Munyo and Rossi (2013) who find that incidental emotional shocks have
a short-lived effect on violence.
Table 4 contains the results from different specifications in the spirit of Equa-
tion 1. Column 1 displays estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator
for force on the first lag of past peer injuries. We use the constant term from
Column (1) as the baseline in Columns 2 through 5. Column 2 estimates
Equation (1) without controlling for the number of former peers on duty in
the given week or test cohort-week fixed effects. Columns (3)-(5) estimate
21
different alternative specifications which control for the number of former
peers on duty in a given week and entrance-exam cohort fixed effects. Our
preferred specification is in Column (2). Across models we estimate large
and statistically significant effects around 7 percent of the baseline mean.
The causal interpretation of our estimates depends on the behavior of offi-
cers who did not suffer a peer injury being similar to those who did, absent
the injury. The CPD’s policy of hiring eligible applicants in lottery order sup-
ports this assumption, as the randomization should lead to these groups be-
ing equal on average. However, the randomization is conducted on the level
of the cohort. Therefore, changes in the applicant pool may lead to cohorts
that systematically differ from one another on unobservable differences that
make them both more likely to experience injuries and inflict force.
While individual fixed effects remove the time-invariant factors, we attempt
to rule out time-variant factors that are influenced by changes in the com-
position of individuals across different testing periods. Columns (4) and (5)
of Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates from Equation 1 including test-
cohort week fixed effects with and without controls for the number of for-
mer peers. We find that the treatment effects do not change substantially
or qualitatively with the introduction of these fixed effects. Estimates are
nearly identical. Furthermore, theR2 numbers in these regressions does not
change from those without these fixed effects. This suggests that the indi-
vidual level fixed-effects do a good job absorbing unobserved differences
between individuals.
To better understand the consequences of the increased use of force, we es-
timate Equation (1) on the probability that a suspect is injured or alleges
an injury. The estimates of Equations (2) and (1) using suspect injury as an
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outcome are shown in Figure (10) and Table (6). The baseline rate of sus-
pect injury is 0.55% in a given week. Injuries to former peers increases the
propensity for suspects to be injured during interactions with the police by
9.78% of the baseline mean (p < 0.087).
5.2 RESULTS USING SAME-RACE FORMER PEERS
So far, our definition of former peer has included everyone who attended
the academy together, but no longer work together in the same police dis-
trict. This definition relies on the assumptions that these individuals were
acquainted with each other and maintained their bonds after the academy
ended. However, since peer groups are large it is unlikely that all of the group
members satisfy these requirements. Indeed, Carrel et al. (2011) find that in-
dividuals forced into exogenous groups end up endogenously forming more
homogeneous groups of friends.
In this setting, such behavior will bias coefficient estimates toward zero, as
we will be pooling treated individuals with those who are not actually treated.
To further test whether these effects are driven by information spread by for-
mer peers, we wish to restrict the peer definition to those who were more
likely to have social interactions. Following McPherson, Smith-Lovin and
Cook (2001), we assume individuals of the same race who attended the academy
together are more likely to be a part of the same network. Past literature
on peer effects shows that peer effects mainly operate within-race (Garlick,
2018).
Figure (11) contains analogous estimates as those estimating Equations (2)
and (1) redefining treatment to be injuries of past peers of the same race.
Similar to before, Figure (11) shows little evidence of differential pre-trends
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before the peer experiences an injury. Consistent with peer group homophily,
officers respond much more strongly to injuries of peers more similar to
them. Under this definition of treatment, officers are 18.13% (p < 0.01) more
likely to use force in the week after a peer is injured, with a baseline proba-
bility of using force of 1.6%.
5.3 HETEROGENEITY
To better understand how officers respond to peer injuries, we investigate
heterogeneity based on the type of force officers use and the characteristics
of the suspects.
5.3.1 TYPES OF FORCEUSED BYOFFICERS
Police officers have several types of force available. The choice of which type
of force to use is governed by the CPD use-of-force model. Generally, the
higher level of resistance the officer faces, the more force they are permitted
to use.
Control tactics are the lowest level of force and include actions such as es-
cort holds, wrist locks, emergency handcuffing, or armbars. The next highest
type of force is physical strikes (defined as a take down, open hand strike,
punches, kicking, elbow) that do not involve more than the officer’s body.
Force involving weapons is classified as non-lethal if it involves a chemical
weapon, baton if the officer uses an impact weapon, or as a Taser or firearm
if those are the weapons involved. Other is a residual category which in-
cludes various uncommon types of force.
We investigate heterogeneity in the types of force officers choose after a for-
mer peer is injured. To do this, we separate force into seven distinct cate-
24
gories and estimate Equation (1) on indicators for using each type of force
and present the results in Table 8.
Since the baseline use of any force is low, the baseline force use for each type
of force-use is very low and more or less decreasing in its severity. The rarest
type of force is the use of firearms, followed by impact weapons such as ba-
tons. The majority of instances of force recorded in this data are from Tasers,
physical attacks, or control tactics. However, there may be less underreport-
ing for types of force that are harder to conceal (firearms and Tasers).
Similar to our main regressions, we do not find any evidence of pre-trends
in any specification except for in the use of non-lethal force. We find that
the officers are primarily responding by increasing control tactics and force
without weapons. There is a substantial increase in the percent of officers
using a firearm in the week after a peer is injured; however this represents a
small percentage point increase.
Assuming that officers are using force in alignment with the CPD use-of-
force model, the increase in force use is primarily driven by encounters with
suspects who offer low levels of resistance. This suggests that absent a peer
injury, officers would have not considered these suspects as a threat. But,
after a peer injury they now view the suspects as non-compliant. We inves-
tigate this claim more directly in the next section.
5.3.2 SUSPECT CHARACTERISTICS
Next, we look at treatment effect heterogeneity depending on the officer-
reported level of resistance of the suspect, the threat posed to the officer,
and the race of the suspect. Table 9 displays variants of Equation (2) on indi-
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cators equal to one if force is used against suspects with a stated resistance
type and presence of a weapon.
We do not find any significant changes in the reported resistance of suspects.
However, we caution the reader to interpret these findings with some skep-
ticism since suspects may disagree with the Officer’s recorded assessment of
their resistance.
Columns (6) and (7) examine the effects based on a more objective mea-
sure of the risk to the officer – whether the suspect was armed. Here, we see
that use of force against armed suspects increases by roughly 6%. Due to a
smaller baseline, we see a larger percentage increase in use of force against
armed suspects; however, this is not statistically significant.
Finally, we investigate heterogeneity based on the similarity of the suspect
to the individual who injured the officer’s peer. Police officers have been
shown to use in previous research to incorporate race in their decision mak-
ing (Fryer, 2018; Knowles, Perisco and Todd, 2011; Grogger and Ridgeway,
2006). Subjects who share the same race with the suspect who injured the
officer’s peer may be at a higher risk of being a victim of force use.
In Table 10, we present the results from nine regressions. In each of these
regressions, the outcome is use of force against a member of the race stated
in the column while the treatment is an indicator for a former peer being in-
jured by an assailant of a certain race. The percent increase in force the week
after treatment is presented as the coefficient with the confidence interval in
brackets below.
We find that use of force against African American subjects significant in-
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creases in the week after an African American individual injures the offi-
cers peer. There are no significant increases in use of force for Hispanic or
White suspects in the week following a similar event. Although the confi-
dence intervals on these estimates are very large, we find no effect of injuries
from Hispanic assailants and that, surprisingly, the probability of using force
against a White suspect falls dramatically after a White assailant injures an
officer.
These results should also be interpreted with caution. Nearly 80% of officer
injuries result from interactions with African American suspects. Similarly,
81% of instances of force are used against African Americans. As such, our
results may be driven by the relatively small number of events observed for
White and Hispanic suspects.
6. INTERPRETATION
Having established that police officers respond to peer injuries, we now at-
tempt to understand what might be driving this behavior. We separate po-
tential explanations into three distinct categories: social learning, traditional
peer effects, and emotional responses.
6.1 SOCIAL LEARNING
The first mechanism we entertain is social learning (Banergee, 1992; Bikhachan-
dani, Hirschleifer and Welch, 1992). If officers maintain close contact with
individuals who contemporaneously attended the police academy, they may
be more likely to learn about injuries-on-duty which occur on their former
peers’ patrols. In this way, injuries to former peers would act as a private
signal of the underlying injury risk during civilian interactions. This may
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lead to officers updating their beliefs about the probability a non-compliant
civilian will injury them, thus increasing their use of force as a means of self-
protection and generating a time-varying correlation between peer injuries
and officer use of force.
Under this interpretation of the effects, friends of injured former peers will
have a second signal about the true injury risk officers face while on duty.
This should translate into a reducing in the probability that the officer expe-
riences an injury herself in the week following a peer injury. We investigate
this by estimating Equations (2) and (1) with the outcome being an indi-
cator function equal to one if the officer was injured in a given week. The
results of this comparison are reported in Figure 10 and column (2) of Table
11. We find that injury risk falls by 0.0181 percentage points, or 7.56% in the
week after a former peer is injured. However, these results are not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels. This leads us to believe that while
social learning may be a potential channel driving force-use, our results are
not conclusive.
6.2 OFFICERSMIMICKING PEER FORCEUSE
The second mechanism we entertain is conventional peer effects. There is
a large body of work showing that individual choices are influenced by the
actions of one’s peer group (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001) and consistent
with our results that peer groups mainly operate within race (Garlick, 2018).
Moreover, Murphy (2017) finds that misconduct by soldiers in the US Army
tend to occur at similar times the misconduct of peers, suggesting that offi-
cers may be responding to the proper or improper use of force by their peers.
Since injury risk and the decision to use force are co-determined, the data
patterns we find might be spurious and result instead from officers choos-
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ing to use force because they learned about their peers’ choices.
Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the decision to use force and
recorded officer injuries in our data set. In 94% of instances where officers
were injured, they are also recorded using force against the suspect. How-
ever, there are over 14,000 instances of force use which are not accompanied
by an officer injury. We use these 14,000 instances of force use to investigate
whether force-use mimicry is driving these results.
Column (1) of table 11 displays the results of a variant of Equation (2) using
an indicator for use-of-force as the outcome and instances of former-peer
force use which is unaccompanied by an officer injury as the treatment. This
effect is small in both percentage point and percent change terms and not
statistically significant. Finding no evidence that officers respond to force-
use by their peers when that use of force is not accompanied by an injury to
their former peers, we rule out the possibility that the results are driven by
traditional peer effects.
6.3 TRANSITORY INCREASES IN RISK AVERSION
Finally, we investigate whether temporary changes in the officers’ prefer-
ences drive these results. Previous literature has shown negative affect can
influence individual’s propensity to engage in violence (see Card and Dahl,
2011; Munyo and Rossi, 2011; Eren and Mocan, 2018).16 Moreover, there are
several laboratory experiments which show that exposure to violence can af-
fect time and risk preferences.
16While this literature focuses on negative affect resulting from the unexpected loss of a
sports match, we expect former peer injury-on-duties to similarly induce negative affect.
Osofsky (1995) shows that violence can reduce an individual’s ability to regulate emotions.
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Loewenstein (1996) has documented that preferences can be malleable and
can be temporarily affected by emotional states. Traumatic events, such as
natural disasters, have been shown to impact risk-preferences (Eckel et al.,
2009; Behir and Willinger, 2013; Cameron and Shah, 2013; Hanaoka et al.,
2018) and trust (Cassar, Healy and Kessler, 2017). Exposure to violence has
been shown to predict preferences for more immediate and less uncertain
rewards. Similarly, Hjort (2014) find that animus discrimination can increase
in response to ethnic conflict and Rohlfs (2010) find that exposure to vio-
lence can make individuals more violent.
This literature suggests that two different types of emotional responses to
peer injuries could lead to an increase in force use: increased risk-aversion
or increased frustration leading to a desire to retaliate. Since police officers
principally use force as a means of self-protection from perceived threats,
heightened risk-aversion would translate into force use as Dionne and Eeck-
houdt (1985) show that the demand for self-protection is increasing in risk-
aversion. On the other hand, increased frustration could increase the re-
turns to retaliating or harming civilians after a peer is injured. Both potential
responses imply immediate increases that dissipate quickly after the event,
as we find in the data.
However, these mechanisms offer different predictions on officers’ decisions
to sort in or out of interactions with civilians. Officers with heightened risk
aversion should be less willing to select into situations in which they may
be harmed while officers who seek to retaliate against civilians may seek out
such interactions. While we cannot directly observe sorting behavior in our
data set, we can use information about complaints against officers to under-
stand their behavior.
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We supplement the primary data set with a data set on complaints against
officers used in Ba (2017).17 Table displays the results from variants of Equa-
tion (2) using different types of complaints as outcomes. This is an indicator
equal to one if the officer committed an action that week resulting in a com-
plaint from either a civilian or a fellow officer.18 Column (1) displays the
results for any type of complaint, column (2) displays the results for com-
plaints for improper force and verbal usage, column (3) shows results for
improper arrests or improper searches and column (5) shows results for fail-
ure to provide service.
We find that the probability an officer commits an action resulting in a com-
plaint increases by about 5.5% the week after a peer is injured. This is driven
mainly be a 15% increase in the probability of receiving a complaint for fail-
ure to provide service in the week after a peer is injured. Arrests for improper
search or arrest also increase after a peer is injured suggesting that officers
may be searching individuals because they viewed them as more likely to be
a threat. Importantly, complaints for improper force use or verbal usage (for
example, racial slurs) decrease by about 7.5% in the week a peer is injured.
Together, this suggests that officers increase their force use in the wake of
peer injuries due to heightened risk-aversion rather than frustration or re-
taliation.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Police officers face the difficult mandate of safely arresting suspects who
pose a risk to themselves or others. While the state empowers officers with
17See Ba (2017) for a more detailed discussion of the complaints.
18Importantly, we consider the timing of the action resulting in a complaint, not the time
of the complaint since that might have a considerable lag.
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the legal use of violence, this violence has negative externalities on society. It
can erode the legitimacy of law enforcement (Tyler 2004; Ramsey and Robin-
son 2015; Lum and Nagin 2017; Nagin and Manski 2017), lead to potentially
violent protests (Basu, Yan and Ford, 2014) and harm the members of the
society that officers are entrusted to protect (Ang, 2019).
This paper explores the role networks play in exacerbating injury risk to of-
ficers. Using novel data from the Chicago Police Department, we construct
an exogenously formed network of officers who later worked in different ar-
eas of the city. Injuries-on-duty cause former peers to increase both their
propensity to use force and the probability they injure a suspect in the fol-
lowing weeks. This effect is larger when restricting the definition of peers to
same-race officers who attended the academy together. Our finding that the
risk of injury-on-duty is statistically unaffected by peer injuries suggests that
social learning is not the main driver of these effects. Similarly, we find that
when officers are not injured, peers do not respond to instances of force use,
suggesting that police officers are not mimicking the behavior of their peers.
Our finding that there is a large increase in the propensity to get a complaint
for failure to provide service after a peer injury suggests that primed risk-
aversion may be the primary driver of the effects.
These findings suggest that the risk of injury can be an important motivator
for the use of force and have externalities on other officers. Policy makers
must take these externalities in to account when determining the optimal
way to reduce improper use of force. Focusing on interventions that reduce
injury risk, may reduce the threat to officers and will have the added benefit
of reducing their propensity to use force. Policies meant to reduce force use
which do not change or increase the risk to officers may have limited effects.
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9. Appendix
9.0.1 Construction of Peer Groups
Summary statistics for these entrance lotteries appears in table 1. On average, 85%
of test takers pass the entrance exam and 20% of these enter the police academy.19
We evaluate the balance of the lotteries by performing a multinomial logisitic re-
gression of start month group on the police officers’ age, race, and sex. We then
use a chi-squared test to determine whether any of the characteristics can predict
entrance to a certain police academy cohort. There appears to be some imbalance
in two of the nine test-cohorts. This imbalance would be concerning if we were ex-
plicitly looking at the effect of contextual effects in police force. However, since the
empirical strategy uses a difference-in-differences design the imbalance in these
two cohorts will not bias the treatment estimates.
For this reason, we restrict the sample to officers who enter one of 25 geographic
districts after graduating from their probationary period. This means that we drop
non-standard units such as the canine unit or S.W.A.T. team, who move between
geographic districts from day to day. We also drop officers who leave the police
academy before six months, or individuals who never are registered as leaving the
police academy in our sample. We cannot link these data to academy cohorts or the
TRR data and cannot be used in the analysis. We also drop thirty-three indiviudals
who have cohort start dates with five or fewer people.
19There is substantial heterogeneity in the portion of eligible people who enter the
academy, ranging from three percent in 2013 to 64% in the first 2006 exam.
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Figure 2: Average Annual Averages of Outcomes
Note: Figure shows the average value of each variable per year for 2004 through 2016. The data used in the figure
includes the full sample of CPD data and non-juvenile subjects.
44
Figure 3: Correlation Between Officer Injuries and Force Use by Others
Note: Graph displays the relationship between the number of officers injured in a given week and the number of
uninjured officers who use force in that same week. Uses the full sample of all officers included in Tactical
Response Reports from 2004 to 2016. The blue line represents the regression line of force use in a given week on
the number of other officers who are injured in that week. Standard error bands are presented around the line.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Cohort Sizes
Figure 5: Distribution of Unit Sizes
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Figure 6: Average Number of Former Peers by Police District
Figure 7: Distribution of the Number of Former Peers
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Figure 8: Addition of New Officers Throughout Sample Period
Note: Vertical bars display the number of new officers added in each month throughout the sample period.
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Figure 9: The Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Police Use of Force
Note: Graph shows Difference-in-Differences coefficients estimated using Equation 2 divided by baseline rate of
force use and 90% confidence intervals. The baseline rate of force is calculated as the constant term from a
regression of force on lags and leads of treatment without fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by academy
cohort (G = 73). Includes individual and district-week fixed effects. Treatment defined as injury of a former peer.
Red vertical line represents treatment.
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Figure 10: The Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Suspect Injuries
Note: Graph shows Difference-in-Differences coefficients estimated using Equation 2 divided by baseline rate of
suspect injuries and 90% confidence intervals. The baseline rate of force is calculated as the constant term from a
regression of force on lags and leads of treatment without fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by academy
cohort (G = 73). Includes individual and district-week fixed effects. Treatment defined as injury of a former peer.
Red vertical line represents treatment.
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Figure 11: The Effect of Same Race Past Peer Injuries on Force Use
Note: Graph shows Difference-in-Differences coefficients estimated using Equation 2 divided by baseline rate of
force use and 90% confidence intervals. The baseline rate of force is calculated as the constant term from a
regression of force on lags and leads of treatment without fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by academy
cohort (G = 73). Includes individual and district-week fixed effects. Treatment defined as injury of a past peer who
is of the same race as the officer. Red vertical line represents treatment.
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Figure 12: The Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Police Injuries
Note: Graph shows Difference-in-Differences coefficients estimated using Equation 2 without a control for
whether the individual was injured in a given week divided by baseline rate of injury and 90% confidence
intervals. The baseline rate of injury is calculated as the constant term from a regression of force on lags and leads
of treatment without fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by academy cohort (G = 73). Includes individual and
district-week fixed effects. Treatment defined as injury of a former peer. Red vertical line represents treatment.
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Figure 13: The Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Complaints for Failure to Pro-
vide Service
Note: Graph shows Difference-in-Differences coefficients estimated using Equation 2 without a control for
whether the individual was injured in a given week divided by baseline rate of injury and 90% confidence
intervals. The baseline rate of injury is calculated as the constant term from a regression of force on lags and leads
of treatment without fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by academy cohort (G = 73). Includes individual and
district-week fixed effects. Treatment defined as injury of a former peer. Red vertical line represents treatment.
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9.2 Tables
Table 1: Police Entrance Lotteries
Exam Dates of Administration Attended Passed Classes Officers P-Value
2002 1/12/2002 3150 No info 16 322 .002
2003 11/22/2003 No No info 5 52 .35
2004 11/20/2004 4163 No info 7 352 .62
2005 2/18/2006; 2/19/2006 4061 3338 3 181 .85
2006-1 6/4/2006 1508 1255 2 145 .26
2006-2 8/6/2006 1025 863 3 191 0.00
2006-3 11/5/2006 1795 1487 14 853 .222
2010
12/11/2010
makeups: 3/12/2011; 6/11/2011;
9/25/2011; 12/3/2011; 6/2/2013;
12/1/2012; 3/9/2013
8621 7689 22 1300 .77
2013
12/14/2013
military makeups 6/28/2014;
12/7/2014; 6/13/2015; 12/6/2015
14788 12877 8 651 .457
Note: Sample includes every officer who started at the police academy between January 2002 and December 2013.
A multinomial logit is run separately for each of the entrance exam dates where the outcome measure is a categor-
ical variable representing the starting month and the right-hand side variables include the sex, age, and race of the
police officer. P-value is from a chi-squared test under the null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are
simultaneously equal to zero.
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Table 2: Frequency of Events
Self-injured Former peer injured Any officer injured
Average Per week .24% 12.05% 95.16%
Observed career Average .89 43.62 368.48
Note: Table uses data from all Tactical Response Reports in the data. The first row displays the percentage for each
category, averaging over every week that the officer appears in the data set. The second row sums all events over
the period of time in which we observe the officer.
Table 3: Force Use and Injuries
Did not use Force Used Force Total
Not Injured 883325 14437 897762
Injured 121 2011 2132
Total 883446 16448 899894
Note: The rows display the total number of events by the decision to use force.
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Table 4: Effect of Injuries to Former Peers on the Propensity to use Force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Force Force Force Force Force
Former peer in previous week 0.00380∗∗∗ 0.00127∗∗ 0.00127∗∗ 0.00131∗∗ 0.00132∗∗
(0.000782) (0.000556) (0.000558) (0.000580) (0.000582)
Constant 0.0178∗∗∗
(0.000585)
Percent Increase 21.28 7.09 7.11 7.36 7.37
Pre-trend Test .000 .822 .822 .660 .664
Individual Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Unit-Week Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Number of Former Peers NO NO YES NO YES
Test Cohort-Week Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
R-squared 0.000 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.045
Observations 896363 896250 896250 896250 896250
Note: Column 1 displays estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator for force on the first lag of past peer
injuries. Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 displayed in columns 2 through 5.
The percent increase is calculated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the p-value from an F test
where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are simultaneously equal to
zero. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Effect of Injuries to Former Peers of the Same Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Force Force Force Force Force
Same-race former peer injured in previous week 0.00694∗∗∗ 0.00296∗∗∗ 0.00297∗∗∗ 0.00315∗∗∗ 0.00315∗∗∗
(0.00108) (0.000922) (0.000924) (0.000946) (0.000949)
Constant 0.0180∗∗∗
(0.000592)
Percent Increase 38.66 16.51 16.55 17.53 17.56
Pre-trend Test 0.00 .613 .605 .953 .951
Individual Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Unit-Week Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Number of Same-Race Former Peers NO NO YES NO YES
Test Cohort-Week Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
R-squared 0.000 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.045
Observations 896363 896250 896250 896250 896250
Note: Column 1 displays estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator for force on the first lag of past peer
injuries. Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 displayed in columns 2 through 5.
Treatment is defined as an injury to an officer who both started the police academy in the same month and is
of the same race. The percent increase is calculated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression
without fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the
p-value from an F test where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are
simultaneously equal to zero. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Suspect Injuries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Injure Suspect Injure Suspect Injure Suspect Injure Suspect Injure Suspect
Former peer injured in previous week 0.00125∗∗∗ 0.000539∗ 0.000537∗ 0.000652∗∗ 0.000652∗∗
(0.000351) (0.000311) (0.000312) (0.000293) (0.000294)
Constant 0.00551∗∗∗
(0.000226)
Percent Increase 22.59 9.78 9.75 11.83 11.83
Pre-trend Test .017 .300 .301 .160 .160
Individual Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Unit-Week Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES
Number of Former Peers NO NO YES NO YES
Test Cohort-Week Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES
R-squared 0.000 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.036
Observations 896363 896250 896250 896250 896250
Note: Column 1 displays estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator for force on the first lag of past peer
injuries. Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 where the outcome is whether
a suspect reported or suffered an injury is displayed in columns 2 through 5. The percent increase is cal-
culated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the p-value from an F test where the null
hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are simultaneously equal to zero.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Effect of Past Peer Injuries on Complaints Against Officers
(1) (3) (4)
Force and Verbal Arrest and Search FPS
Former peer injured in previous week -0.000252 0.000405∗ 0.000361∗∗
(0.000202) (0.000206) (0.000177)
Percent Increase -7.59 8.19 14.74
Pre-trend Test .412 .558 .652
Individual Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Unit-Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Number of Former Peers NO NO NO
Test Cohort-Week Fixed Effects NO NO NO
R-squared 0.037 0.038 0.029
Observations 896250 896250 896250
Note: Column 1 displays estimates from an OLS regression of an indicator for force on the first lag of past peer
injuries. Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 where the outcome is whether
an officer received a compliant for an action occurring the week following a peer injury displayed in columns
2 through 5. The percent increase is calculated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression
without fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the
p-value from an F test where the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are
simultaneously equal to zero. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects by Type of Force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control No Weapon Non-Lethal Baton Taser Firearm Other
Lagged Former Peer Injury 0.000723∗∗ 0.000986∗ -0.00000891 -0.0000237 0.0000936 0.000110∗ 0.0000889
(0.000356) (0.000499) (0.0000815) (0.0000663) (0.000135) (0.0000648) (0.000161)
Baseline .0105 .0147 .0008 .0005 .0017 .0003 .0011
Percent Increase 6.89 6.71 -1.11 -4.73 5.51 36.66 8.08
Pre-Trend Test .539 .659 .005 .165 .726 .930 .882
Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Unit-Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250
Note: Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 displayed. The percent increase is
calculated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the p-value from an F test where the
null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are simultaneously equal to zero.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects by Suspect Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Passive Active Assault Battery Deadly Unarmed suspect Armed suspect
Lagged Former Peer Injury 0.0000650 0.000777 0.0000752 0.000275 0.000132 0.00104∗∗ 0.000198
(0.0000619) (0.000505) (0.000168) (0.000251) (0.0000817) (0.000485) (0.000179)
Baseline .0002 .0088 .0038 .005 .0004 .0162 .0017
Percent Increase 32.52 8.83 1.98 5.5 33.06 6.4 11.67
Pre-Trend Test .2611 .098 .2197 .116 .4158 .6841 .7834
Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Unit-Week FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250 896250
Note: Percent change from variations of Equation 1. The percent increase is calculated by dividing the coefficient
by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the academy cohort (G =
73).Standard errors presented in brackets below the percent change.
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Table 10: Heterogeneous Effects by Race
Suspect Race
Assailant Race Black Hispanic White
(N = 13251) (N = 2022) (N = 999)
Black 7.95** 6.94 5.28
(1650 Events) [.74,15.16] [-10.66,24.54] [-19.19,29.75]
Hispanic -.42 3.78 23.24
(281 Events) [-15.56,14.72] [-42.08,49.64] [-35.47,81.94]
White 1.66 30.63 -42.26*
(146 Events) [-21.67,24.99] [-21.55,82.82] [-87.71,3.18]
Note: Percent change from variations of Equation 1. The percent increase is calculated by dividing the coefficient
by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73).
P-values presented in brackets under the percent change.
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Table 11: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3)
Force Injured FPS Complaints
Former peer used-force in previous week 0.000487
(0.000340)
Former peer injured in previous week -0.000181 0.000361∗∗
(0.000166) (0.000177)
Percent Increase 3.11 -7.56 14.45
Pre-Trend Test .218 .545 .652
Individual FE YES YES YES
Unit-Week FE YES YES YES
Number of Past Peers YES YES YES
R-Squared 0.0420 0.0281 0.0293
Observations 896250 896250 896250
Note: Difference-in-Differences coefficients from variations of Equation 1 displayed. The percent increase is
calculated by dividing the coefficient by the baseline in a regression without fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by the academy cohort (G = 73). Pre-trend test presents the p-value from an F test where the
null hypothesis is that the coefficients are the lead periods from equation 2 are simultaneously equal to zero.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
